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Abstract
Does crime respond to changes in the minimum wage? A growing body of empirical evidence
indicates that increases in the minimum wage have a displacement effect on low-skilled workers.
Economic reasoning provides the possibility that dis-employment may cause youth to substitute
from legal work to crime. However, there is also the countervailing effect of a higher wage
raising the opportunity cost of crime for those who remain employed. We use the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort to measure the effect of increases in the minimum
wage on self-reported criminal activity and examine employment-crime substitution. Exploiting
changes in state and federal minimum wage laws from 1997 to 2010, we find that workers who
are affected by a change in the minimum wage are more likely to commit crime, become idle, and
lose employment. Individuals experiencing a binding minimum wage change were more likely to
commit crime and work only part time. Analyzing heterogeneity shows those with past criminal
connections are especially likely to see decreased employment and increased crime following a
policy change, suggesting that reduced employment effects dominate any wage effects. The
findings have implications for policy regarding both the low-wage labor market and efforts to
deter criminal activity.
1
1 Introduction
Does raising the minimum wage have the unintended effect of increasing crime? Economic reasoning
and the recent literature on the minimum wage lead us to believe that the answer may be yes. If
increases in the minimum wage lead to unemployment and idleness, some youth may choose crime as
an alternative source of income. Research in “the new economics of the minimum wage” shows that
increases in the minimum wage displace lower-skill workers and cause higher levels of unemployment
among youth and workers with weak labor attachment.1 Moreover, increases in the minimum wage
raise the probability that teenagers will be idle: they are more likely to leave school and, conditional
on not being in school, more likely to be unemployed.2 Numerous studies have shown that idle
youth are more likely to engage in crime, whether because they are not in school or not working.3
The existing evidence for the causal relationship between the minimum wage and crime is some-
what limited. Hashimoto (1987) provides national time-series evidence that a positive relationship
between the minimum wage and crime does exist in the United States. A limitation, however, of
using nationally aggregated data to examine crime is that much of the variation in crime is lost.
Additionally, national changes in the minimum wage may not be exogenous with respect to low-skill
labor markets and crime-employment trends. We expand on the evidence by using micro-level panel
data on the criminal activity of minimum wage workers. The theoretical implications of a change
in the minimum wage on crime are ambiguous: increasing unemployment may increase substitution
toward illicit employment, but the opportunity costs of crime today and in the future may also
increase as wages rise, dampening incentives to commit crime today.4
We employ panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) cohort
to identify the effect of changes in the minimum wage on participation in crime. We exploit changes
1Neumark and Wascher (2006) conduct a review of studies that examine the employment effect of changes in the
minimum wage. See also Currie and Fallick (1996), Ahn et al. (2011), Burkhauser et al. (2000) and Sabia et al.
(2012).
2Neumark and Wascher (1995) use matched CPS data to study the effect of minimum wages on employment and
enrollment decisions of youth. They find that increases in the minimum wage raise the likelihood that lower-skilled
teenagers will become unemployed, replaced by higher-skilled teenagers who leave school. They also find an increase
in the probability that displaced workers will be not only unemployed but also not enrolled in school.
3Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen (2006) estimate that daily juvenile property crime decreases by 14% and
28.8% on days that students must be in school, respectively. Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001) and Gould et al.
(2002a) find that declining labor opportunities cause an increase in crime. In particular, Raphael and Winter-Ember
(2001) find that an increase in unemployment causes a rise in property crimes, which are crimes often associated with
illicit income.
4Harris and Todaro (1970) show a minimum wage in a two-sector model can induce queuing and increase employ-
ment in the uncovered sector; Lochner (2004) discusses current and future opportunity costs of crime.
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in state and federal minimum wage laws between 1997 and 2010. The NLSY97 data allows our
study to make several contributions. First, due to the detailed nature of the employment and
crime history in the data, we are able to test if movement in or out of crime is due to changes
in employment status. Next, the fine level at which the NLSY is collected allows us to control
for individual characteristics and examine many types of crime. Our ability to examine such
heterogeneity suggests that our work can be considered a micro-level complement to Hashimoto
(1987). Lastly, the data allow us to directly identify individuals who were bound by changes in the
minimum wage, rather than approximating the treatment group based on general demographics.5
We find compelling evidence that an increase in the minimum wage displaces youth from licit
employment and increases criminal activity. Interestingly, both crimes related to monetary gain and
violence increase. Our estimates show that workers who are affected by a change in the minimum
wage are 1.3 percentage points more likely to be idle and 7.6 percentage points less likely to be
employed full time. The probability of being employed less than full time and committing crime
increases by 1.4 percentage points.
These findings have implications for policy regarding both the low-wage labor market and
criminal activity. Our results raise the hope of using policies that encourage employment to reduce
crime in the short and long term, given that current market work both decreases current criminal
activity and raises the opportunity costs of future crime.6 The findings also point toward the
short and long-term dangers of policies which increase unemployment, even for short durations,
among those on the margin of licit and illicit work. Regardless of overall net-employment effects,
it appears minimum wage increases also increase crime. Given the contemporaneous costs of crime
and especially the long-term consequences (generating “criminal” human capital, future arrests
and recidivism), minimum wages as a policy for fighting poverty appear unattractive along this
dimension.
5A similar panel analysis could be performed on state- or county-level crime data, but such an analysis would be
unable to capture individual levels of heterogeneity and the ability to identify minimum wage workers.
6Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001), Gould et al. (2002b), and Machin and Meghir (2004) demonstrate that
criminal activity responds to both employment and wages.
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2 Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth is an ideal data set for studying the effects of the
minimum wage on crime because it allows us to identify workers affected by changes in the minimum
wage and control for individual-level heterogeneity. The annual survey collects detailed information
about youth educational and labor market experiences, as well as family background, relationships,
and personal behavior (including criminal behavior).
The NLSY97 follows a cohort of nearly 9,000 respondents who were between the ages of 12 to 16
years old as of 1997. The data spans from 1997-2010, during which time there were four increases
in the Federal minimum wage and several changes at the state level. We use NLSY97 data linked
to confidential state geocoded information to match respondents to the binding minimum wage
during each survey wave as in Currie and Fallick (1996). The binding minimum wage in a given
state-year is determined by the maximum of the state and federal minimum wage at that time.
We are able to identify individuals affected by changes in the binding minimum wage by ob-
serving employment histories and wages. Bound workers are identified by three criteria. First, they
must have lived in a state that experienced a change in the minimum wage during the years directly
before and after the change. Second, in the year preceding a minimum wage increase, the individ-
ual must have been employed in a job where his/her nominal wage was less than the upcoming
nominal minimum wage but not less than the current minimum wage. Lastly, the minimum wage
job must be in an industry covered by the minimum wage. In our data, we consider jobs reported
as agricultural, military, self-employed, or public administration to be uncovered.7
In each wave, survey respondents were asked about their participation in criminal activity,
including selling illegal drugs and stealing. We are confident in the use of self-reported criminal
activity: self reports have been found to be accurate representations of official crime reports (Hin-
delang, 1981). Further, we do not use arrest data because of the possible endogeneity of policy
changes and policing.8 We denote criminal activity by an indicator that respondents reported
having engaged in selling drugs, stealing, vandalism, other property crimes, or violence since the
7Respondents to the NLSY97 report up to 11 wages in a given survey year. A respondent is considered to be
bound by a minimum wage change if at least one of the reported jobs fits the aforementioned criteria. Jobs with
reported wages of zero dollars are considered invalid and excluded from the data.
8We are unable to make use of national incident-based data, such as National Incident-Based Reporting System
data, due to changes in jurisdictional reporting during the time period that we study.
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date of their last interview. For respondents who ever report criminal activity, missing values are
replaced by zeros under the assumption that any lack of response is due to inactivity.9
We also separate crimes by monetary and non-monetary motivation, with money-related crimes
being theft, drug sale, and “other property” crimes.10 Non-monetary crimes are defined as property
damage and violent crimes (fighting or attacking with the intent to hurt).
Table 1 provides summary statistics of employment, wage, and individual characteristics for the
full data sample as well as by age. Approximately 60 percent of the individual-year observations
have wage information that can be used to assign minimum wage worker status. Of those, approx-
imately 4% are records for individuals in a state and year where they were bound by a minimum
wage change. Minimum wage employment is most common at ages 14-19, as is generally known
to be the case (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). The crime statistics reflect the usual age-crime
profile, with highest criminal activity occurring during teenage years.11 Wage and hour information
based on the job at which respondents work the most hours per week show increasing wages and
hours with age.
3 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in whether a change in the minimum wage causes bound workers to turn to
crime, possibly from losing their jobs and becoming idle, thus we examine criminal activity and
employment outcomes. Our estimating equation in the crime regressions is
1{Crimeait = 1} = αa0 + βa1{MWBoundait}+ γaXait + eait (1)
where the dependent variable is an indicator that respondent i committed a crime (e.g. drug sale,
property theft/illegal sale, violence, etc.) at age a in year t, the year of the minimum wage increase.
Age is defined as four age groups: 14-16, 17-19, 20-24, and 25-30 years old. Estimations are run
9This approach replaces 31 percent of missing answers regarding activity in overall crime affecting approximately
74 percent of respondents who ever report criminal activity. We do not replace missing values for respondents who
never report criminal activity (individuals who have only missing values and/or report zero crime). Alternative
treatments of missing values did not impact our analysis.
10The NLSY questionnaire suggests “other property” crimes as “fencing, receiving, possessing or selling stolen
property, or cheat[ing] someone by selling them something that was worthless or worth much less than what [the
respondent] said it was.”
11It is difficult to make a direct comparison between these numbers and national crime statistics. Here we present
crime participation rates, whereas national crime statistics are measures of crime incidence.
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separately by age group.12 The treatment indicator, 1{MWBoundait}, for being bound by the
minimum wage change is defined above. Xait includes gender, race, individual background controls
(defined below) and vectors of year fixed effects and single-year age effects to control for national
trends in crime and the crime-age profile. The coefficients of interest are the vector of βα’s.
One concern with the baseline estimates may be that they miss a low-wage worker effect on
crime or an endogeneity problem with increases in the minimum wage. The low-wage worker effect
would be present if workers who receive low remuneration from licit labor are more likely to commit
crime or lose their job, regardless of whether they are affected by a change in the minimum wage.
The policy endogeneity problem may occur if states that raise the minimum wage are also the states
with the largest crime, employment, or enrollment problems.13 In both cases, our minimum wage
worker indicator alone cannot differentiate these effects from our focus: the effect of a minimum
wage increase on workers bound by the change.
To address this problem, we also specify models that include an indicator for low-wage workers
(LowWage) and for living in a state where the minimum wage increased (ChangeMW ). In the
event that some changing states have higher crime rates than non-changing states, we also include
state fixed effects in some specifications. If any of these effects is the driving factor behind what
we observe in our baseline results, the coefficient on MWBound should lose significance with the
appropriate indicators absorbing the effect. Low wage workers are defined as individuals who had a
wage within $0.36 of the binding minimum wage, even if there is no change in the minimum wage.
We use $0.36 because on average, workers bound by the minimum wage have wages $0.36 below the
new binding minimum wage. We also add controls for observable individual-level characteristics,
such as academic achievement measured by math PIAT score in 1997, mother’s education, and
household income in 1997.
We pool the age groups to estimate effects on employment, using an indicator for employment
as the dependent variable.14 The controls remain the same, so we estimate
12Age groups are admittedly adhoc, though the division does capture major features of the crime-age profile.
Results combining all teenagers were largely similar.
13Lemos (2005) shows that minimum wage changes do not appear to be endogenous to employment conditions in
Brazil.
14Missing data for each variable are replaced as zeros for respondents who reported this information in any other
year of the survey. Pooling the age groups improves precision in the employment regression, point estimates are
similar with and without pooling.
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1{Employit = 1} = α0 +
4∑
a=1
βa1{MWBoundit} × 1{agegrpit = a}+ γXit + eit, (2)
with a common γ vector to improve precision.
The estimation procedure is limited to individuals who were working in the year before the
change in the minimum wage. Individuals who were not working cannot be included because
it is impossible to assign minimum wage worker status to someone who has no reported wages.
Moreover, we are interested in movement from licit to illicit labor, so the correct starting group is
individuals involved in licit labor.
4 Estimates
4.1 Crime
We estimate linear probability and logit models on self-reported crime. We look at overall criminal
activity, crimes grouped by motive, and finally crimes by offense. We find that crimes increase
among minimum wage-bound workers and most strongly among teenagers, and that these increases
occur among both monetary and non-monetary crimes.
Overall crime increases with the minimum wage for all of our age groups. Table 2 provides OLS
results in the top panel and logit results in the bottom panel. Youth’s crime-related decisions appear
to be the most sensitive to changes in the minimum wage. OLS estimates show that affected 14-16
year-olds are 8.4 percentage points more likely to commit crimes, and 17-19 year-olds increase crime
by 3.4 to 4.1 percentage points.15 Older ages experience smaller effects. The additional controls
in Column (2) help to uncover the minimum wage effect for 14-16 year-olds. For older age groups,
however, Column (2) contains smaller estimates. For those workers, some of the estimated effect
from Column (1) may be due to a low wage worker propensity towards crime.
Disaggregated Crime Table 3 presents the results for monetary and non-monetary crimes, as
well as crimes by different offenses. Here we use the specification that controls for low-wage worker
effects and additional individual controls, so that identification comes from within state changes in
minimum wage laws.
15Marginal effects from the logit specification are similar.
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Monetary crimes, defined as stealing, drug sale, and “other property” crimes such as dealing in
stolen property, increase among young teens but decline among young adults, which may be due to
substitution among different-aged workers in low-skill labor markets. In particular, among 14-16
year-olds crime increases by 8.3 percentage points but declines by 2 percentage points for 20-24
year-olds.16 A disaggregated look at monetary crimes also shows a sizable an increase in theft by
25-30 year-olds, consistent with increases in idleness.
Non-monetary crimes, defined as vandalism and violence, also increase for older age groups.
Violent acts performed by 17-19 year-olds increase by 2.3 percentage points and by 1.6 percentage
points for 25-30 year-olds, consistent with increases in idleness. For 17-19 year-olds, relative to an
unconditional average crime rate of 8.26, this is a 28% increase in violence. Jacob and Lefgren
(2003) also find that youth violence increases by approximately 28%, usind different data and when
identification is driven by school cancellations. Logit results account for the non-linearity of the
dependent variable and confirm the same patterns as the LPM.17
4.2 Employment and School Enrollment Effects
We look at employment and school enrollment for increases in unemployment and idleness. Given
the evidence on increases in crime, we examine whether there are corresponding changes in the
labor market and schooling.
Disemployment Table 4 shows the increase in the minimum wage has a negative effect on the
employment of minimum wage workers. The first panel of Table 4 presents OLS estimates, while
the second panel presents logit estimates. In each panel, Columns (1) and (3) present the estimates
of Equation 2 for OLS and logit specifications, respectively. Column (2) and (4) add state fixed
effects, controls for changing the minimum wage, low-wage status, and individual controls.
Here employment is defined as working any type of job at any time during the year, whether self-
employed or as an employee. Teenagers experience a decline in employment of 4 percentage points,
while even older adults become see reduced employment, by about 3 percentage points. These
results align with the competitive model of the labor market. There is no significant disemployment
16Marginal effects from the logit and OLS specifications are comparable.
17Standard errors are not clustered at the state level because we include state fixed effects.
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effect, however for 20-24 year-olds.18 The logit results remain significant for older adults, but
become insignificant for teens. Imprecision in the estimates may be due to the limited number of
young teenagers working in our sample.
The results for youth are directly comparable in magnitude to what Currie and Fallick (1996)
find using NLSY79 data. Zavodny (2000) also finds a negative effect on the likelihood of em-
ployment, though not as large. Although few studies have observed disemployment effects of the
minimum wage among adults in their 20s, that may be due to the fact that those studies depend
upon data at a higher aggregation level and cannot identify which workers in those age groups were
bound by changes in the minimum wage. Because a small group of adults work at the minimum
wage, it stands to reason that aggregate data may miss the effect that we find here.
Weeks employed To take a closer look at the disemployment effects, we examine how the
time spent employed, measured in weeks, is affected by increases in the minimum wage. This
measurement allows us to observe disemployment effects at a finer level of detail than the binary
employment measure. For example, if it is the case that some individuals become unemployed
but find employment within the same year, the effect would be captured in the weeks-worked
measurement but overlooked by the binary measurement. This may also explain why, although
most of the point estimates in the binary regressions are negative, not all are statistically significant.
Columns (5) through (7) of Table 4 show the results of regressing weeks employed at time t on
an increase in the minimum wage. Columns (5) and (6) show tobit regressions of weeks worked
conditional on being employed previous to a change in the minimum wage. Column (5) uses the
controls of Equation 1. Column (6) adds state fixed effects, controls for changing the minimum
wage, low-wage status, and individual controls. Column (7) shows a linear regression of weeks
worked conditional on being employed both before and after the minimum wage change. Column
(7) contains the full set of controls described earlier.
Column (5) shows that, with the inclusion of individuals who become unemployed, an increase
in the minimum wage decreases the time spent employed by nearly 2 weeks for 17-19 year-olds, 4
weeks for 20-24 year-olds, and over 11 weeks for 25-30 year-olds. With the inclusion of additional
controls in Column (6), these effects persist. Part of the effects observed in Column (5) may be
18Thompson (2009) finds that workers of a similar age range, 19-22 years-old, do not experience disemployment
effects due to the minimum wage.
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attributable to a low-wage worker effect: low-wage workers work nearly 2 weeks less than higher
wage workers. However, the change in the minimum wage still has a negative effect on bound
workers with the magnitude of the effect increasing monotonically with age.
Column (7) focuses on the employment hours of workers who remain employed after a change in
the minimum wage. Predictably, these estimates are smaller in magnitude than those in Columns
(5) and (6). In Column (7), it appears that young adults who are bound by a change in the
minimum wage and remain employed still experience some disemployment effects.
These results, when combined with the binary employment results, suggest that an increase in
the minimum wage raises the likelihood that individuals will become unemployed and experience
longer spells of unemployment.
School Enrollment Students who reach the legal dropout age are more likely to dropout of
school when the minimum wage increases. We restrict the data to 14-19 year-olds to estimate the
effect on school enrollment. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show that 17-19 year-olds of dropout
age have lower enrollment rates by 3 to 4.7 percentage points.19
Overall, these results indicate that youth spend more time unemployed and out of school when
the minimum wage increases, and adults also experience greater unemployment. This pattern of
results is consistent with the increases in crime rates that we observed earlier. Namely, substitution
from work to crime fits with two age groups who experience an increase in crime: 14-16 and 25-
30 year-olds also displayed disemployment effects.20 Meanwhile, among adults aged 20-24 results
are consistent with a rising opportunity cost, as they do not display strong disemployment effects
and therefore should decrease crime as the minimum wage raises the opportunity cost of crime.
Finally, age 17-19-year-olds see an increase in the probability of dropping out of school alongside a
noticeable increase in violence.
19Chaplin et al. (2003) also find that dropout-eligible teens leave school when the minimum wage rises.
20Although the disemployment effects for 14-16 year-olds lack precision, teens who commit crime also experience
the strongest disemployment effects. OLS estimates on employment become more negative and precise when limited
to individuals who ever commit crime.
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5 Multinomial Choice
Our estimates show that an increase in the binding minimum wage has an effect on employment
and criminal activity related to monetary gain among minimum wage workers. To understand to
what degree the increase in crime is due to substitution with licit work, we estimate a multinomial
choice model where individuals decide over six mutually exclusive choices, the cross product of (1)
being employed full time, part-time, or not at all, and (2) either committing a crime or not.21 The
utility for each choice j made by individual i in period t is
Uijt = αj + βj1{MWBoundit}+ δjXit + eijt (3)
Our covariates include an indicator for being bound by a minimum wage change, which combines
wage and disemployment effects, such as losing one’s job and accompanying job-search, or experi-
encing a change in work hours.22 We also include controls for living in a state that changed the
minimum wage, low-wage status, gender, race, age group, and year. Assuming that the error terms
have a joint normal distribution, we can estimate this model using a multinomial probit.
Rewriting the equation in general form as
Uijt = Zitθj
The probability of each choice j is φ(Zitθj). We are interested in the marginal effect of being bound
by a minimum wage change on each choice probability, so we evaluate the derivate of each choice
probability with respect to a change in the minimum wage.
Given the competitive model of labor markets, we expect to see positive effects on choices
without employment (E0). The substitution between work and crime suggests that as youth are
forced out of employment, either through losing a job or a reduction in hours, they will move into
illicit labor. This gives us a second expected result on choices that involve crime (C1).
21Full time is defined as greater than 48 weeks employed, being unemployed is having zero weeks.
22Information on search is not available for much of our sample (76% are missing betwen-job search information).
Nonetheless the conditional means of search were informative: indviduals bound by a minimum wage who committed
a crime searched at 43.4% annual rate, while those who did not commit a crime, but still experienced a binding
minimum wage, search at at 32.3% rate. Thus it appears a major reason for part-time work among those committing
a crime is search frictions in the labor market.
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5.1 Results
Tables 6 through 7 present the average marginal effect on the probability of each employment-
crime choice for raising the minimum wage or being a worker bound by a change relative to workers
in a state that has changed the minimum wage, respectively. Each table row represents separate
estimates on each type of crime including overall crime, monetary vs. non-monetary motivation,
and the disaggregated crimes. Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated by the delta
method. We also report the results of a significance test for the relevant variable across the three
equations of the model, given as a Wald test statistic and the corresponding p-value.
Table 6 shows the marginal effects associated with a change in the minimum wage, overall.
These can be interpreted as the change in choice probabilities for workers in states where minimum
wage increases (relative to workers where there was no increase). Workers who are not bound by
changes in the minimum wage appear relatively unaffected by the policy change: there is a small
and weakly significant increase in crime among those not employed or employed part-time. In
particular, property theft increases by less than 0.2 percentage points. These results may indicate
that minimum wage effects are concentrated among workers who are actually bound by the change.
The marginal effects of an increase in the minimum wage for bound workers are given in Table 7.
These results represent the change in choice probabilities for bound workers relative to workers in
an uncovered industry or who have wages above the wage floor. For each crime, the coefficients on
the indicator for bound worker status are significant at least at the 95% significance level. We see
uniform reducations in the probability of full-time work, accompanied by increases in the likelihood
of working part-time, not working or committing a crime, and significant increases in working part-
time and commiting a crime. In the first row the probability of being a full-time employed non-
criminal falling by 7.6 percentage points and the probability of being idle increasing by 1.3 points.
Those who formerly would have been employed and not committing crime now turn to crime –
the probability of committing a crime while employed increases by 1.4 percentage points, and this
occurs among both money-motivated and non-money crimes. Looking at disaggregated crimes
we very similar magnitude effects. All of the increase in non-monetary crime is attributable the
substantial rise in violent crime. In these specifications we see little substitution from employment to
unemployed-crime. This may be because our sample conditions on being employed in the past year,
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and thus selects out those most likely to be unable or uninterested in finding any licit employment
through the course of a year.
The better understand the sources of this substitution, we interact the indicator of being a
worker bound by the minimum wage with an indicator of gang membership in the initial survey
year, 1997. Results are presented in Table 8, with the first two rows and second two rows coming
from the same multinomial probit models respectively. Here we can see that the dis-employment
effects are quite large among individuals with a gang history within the two samples (those for
whom we have information on committing any crime or a violent crime) showing reductions in
full-time work of between 15 and 20%. This group includes many individuals who dropped out of
school, and have more limited labor market experience.23 The table reveals that crime increases for
this group dominate those of the group without gang ties in 1997, and that crime while unemployed
also significantly increases among gang members. The fact that violent crime in particular goes
up among former gang-members suggests that these individuals turn to gangs in response to an
increased minimum wage.24
Overall the results suggest that among the population who are bound by the minimum wage,
the probability of both working and committing crime increases within a year. Thus for these indi-
viduals it appears the crime complements employment, both through monetary and non-monetary
channels. These may include supplementary income (theft) or through increased violence during
spells of idleness or from associations with gang-networks for whom violence is often a means to
income. The lack of substitution toward non-work and crime may be due to the fact that minimum-
wage-bound workers are a selected group, more likely to work and less likely to rely solely on crime
for income.
23Gang members were 25% more likely to be high school drop outs, and 38% more likely to not be employed over
the current year.
24A number of interesting questions regarding transitions between the licit and illicit labor market can in principle
be addressed with our data, but in practice are difficult to document. Examining transitions of those committing a
crime in t− 1 into the labor market at t showed the opposite of a queuing effect: the probability of non-employment
increased among this group following a minimum wage increase. Similarly, looking at the increased probability of
working (either full or part time) following participation in a crime at t-1 we saw no significant impact of the changing
minimum wage on work for this group.
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6 Conclusion
Did raising the minimum wage increase crime in the United States over the past 15 years? The
evidence we present suggests the answer is yes. Further, our results indicate that this increase
in crime occurs across the board, with increases in theft, drug sale, and violent crime. Among
the employed these increases appear occur due to a decrease in labor income from reduced work.
Effects are particularly large for low-skilled workers with prior criminal connections.
Our results highlight the importance of providing employment opportunities for young, unskilled-
youth given the evidence for a relationship between licit and illicit work. They also point to the
dangers both to the individual and to society from policies that restrict the already limited em-
ployment options of this group. Our results indicate that crime will increase by 1.9 percentage
points among 14-30 year-olds as the minimum wage increases, with effects being even larger among
teenagers. With an average overall crime rate at 12.1%, this is a substantial increase. The social
costs to raising the minimum wage may not appear in net employment or unemployment changes,
but nonetheless appear non-trivial.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
All Ages 14-16 Ages 17-19 Ages 20-24 Ages 25-30
% Assignable wage info 61.98 10.41 60.43 77.45 78.81
% MW bound 3.91 7.81 7.47 2.39 3.1
Hourly wages 14.28 7.13 7.66 15.09 18.9
Hours per week 32.4 17.0 27.1 33.5 36.4
% Any crime 12.11 31.30 21.68 9.12 4.25
% Monetary crime 8.79 20.70 15.03 6.55 3.27
% Non-Monetary crime 7.33 21.15 12.51 5.24 2.45
% Sold drugs 5.61 8.08 7.40 4.78 3.56
% Stole value < $50 4.65 13.87 8.52 2.94 1.19
% Stole value ≥ $50 2.03 5.25 3.11 1.39 0.65
% Property destruction 3.66 12.58 6.30 2.32 0.94
% Other property crime 1.95 5.12 2.96 1.30 0.74
% Violent crime 5.48 12.15 8.26 4.26 2.40
% Male 50.3 58.08 51.46 49.55 49.84
% Female 49.7 41.92 48.54 50.45 50.16
% Black 24.8 21.94 22.87 24.9 26.53
% Hisp 20.75 17.7 18.83 21.28 21.77
% Mixed, non-Hisp 0.9 0.86 0.9 0.92 0.86
% Not black, non-Hisp 53.55 59.5 57.39 52.9 50.84
Observations 62,878 1,627 14,733 29,174 17,344
17
Table 2: Probability of Committing a Crime
Linear Probability Model
(1) (2)
14-16 0.0526 0.0838*
(0.046) (0.048)
17-19 0.0416*** 0.0345**
(0.014) (0.015)
20-24 -0.0051 -0.0160
(0.012) (0.013)
25-30 0.0201** 0.0215**
(0.010) (0.010)
Logit
(1) (2)
14-16 0.239 0.398*
(0.210) (0.228)
17-19 0.226*** 0.185**
(0.079) (0.087)
20-24 -0.08 -0.222
(0.158) (0.169)
25-30 0.428** 0.448**
(0.213) (0.219)
Binary crime outcome regressed on (1) an indicator for being bound
by a change in the minimum wage interacted with age group indicators
along with year, age, race, and gender fixed effects; (2) controls of
(1) with indicators for state change in minimum wage and low-wage
worker status, mother’s education, math PIAT score, household income
in 1997, and state fixed effects conditional on being employed. Crimes
are defined as property destruction, stealing, other property crime (such
as dealing in stolen property), violence, and drug sale. Regression is
run separately for each age group. Standard errors in parentheses. * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5: Effects on School Enrollment
Linear Probability Model
(1) (2)
14-16 -0.0044 -0.0008
(0.053) (0.053)
17-19 0.0226 0.0382
(0.044) (0.044)
1{CanDropOut} -0.0339 -0.0539**
(0.025) (0.025)
14-16 Can Dropout 0.0147 0.0303
(0.062) (0.062)
17-19 Can Dropout -0.0471*** -0.0309*
(0.017) (0.017)
1{ChangeMW} -0.0099
(0.011)
1{LowWage} -0.0137*
(0.007)
Observations 25,157 25,157
R-squared 0.079 0.101
Logit
(1) (2)
14-16 -0.2660 -0.2470
(0.631) (0.634)
17-19 0.311 0.401
(0.441) (0.443)
1{CanDropOut} -0.672** -0.778***
(0.293) (0.297)
14-16 Can Dropout 0.421 0.518
(0.742) (0.745)
17-19 Can Dropout -0.229** -0.146
(0.089) (0.094)
1{ChangeMW} -0.0561
(0.057)
1{LowWage} -0.0791*
(0.042)
Observations 25,156 25,156
Binary enrollment outcome on (1) an indicator for being bound by
a change in the minimum wage interacted with age group indicators
along with year, age, race, and gender fixed effects; (2) controls of
(1) with indicators for state change in minimum wage and low-wage
worker status, mother’s education, math PIAT score, household income
in 1997, and state fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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